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CROLL v. CROLL AND THE
UNFORTUNATE IRONY OF THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION: PARENTS WITH “RIGHTS
OF ACCESS” GET NO RIGHTS TO
ACCESS COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION

I

nternational parental child abduction is a complex and serious problem.1 This problem has become increasingly
common due to the relative ease and accessibility of international travel.2 Due to the increase in the interconnectedness
among citizens of different countries, it is not surprising that
there has been an increase in international family relationships.3 As the number of international family relationships has
increased, so too have the problems in the area of international
child abductions.4 One of the main legal problems caused by
international child abductions is that when a child has been
taken abroad it is very difficult to enforce one’s parental rights
in one’s home state.5 Instead, the left-behind parent must pur6
sue a remedy in the country where the child is located. As the
problems with enforcing parental rights internationally became
apparent, it became more and more critical for the international
community to reach a satisfactory agreement on what to do

1. 2004 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, U.S. Dep’t of State (2004), available
at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Report on Compliance].
2. Saniya O’Brien, Note, The Trials and Tribulations of Implementing the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Improving Dispute Resolution and Enforcement of Parental Rights in the International Arena, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 197 (2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. ANNE MARIE HUTCHINSON & HENRY SETRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL
PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 3 (1998).
6. Id.
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7
about international child abductions. The international community needed not only to decide the best way to prevent the
occurrence of international child abductions, but also to provide
the courts in different countries with a method for handling the
complex problems that arise after an international child abduction.8 Consequently, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,9 which was finalized
10
and adopted in 1980, was created due to the worldwide recognition of the harmful effects on the children of parental kidnapping and the desire to deter future abductions.11 While interna-

7. Id.
8. See Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational
Litigation for Feminists Concerned about Domestic Violence Here and Abroad,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 764–65 (2003) (illustrating the complexity of the problems presented by international child abduction). In her
article, Weiner points out that:
[T]he Hague Convention was drafted based upon the prediction that
a noncustodial father, or a father who was unlikely to win custody,
would typically be the abductor.…As it turns out, the drafters’ vision
of a typical abduction has proven incorrect. Published figures indicate that seventy percent of the abductors are now mothers, typically
the child’s primary caretaker. Often these mothers are victims of
domestic violence, and they are fleeing transnationally with their
children in order to escape domestic violence.
Id. In light of these concerns, courts often face the troublesome possibility of
having to send domestic violence victims to return to their abusers, which was
certainly not the original intent of the Convention. Therefore, some courts
have attempted to fashion their own remedies to protect women who have fled
to another country in order to escape domestic violence. These remedies aim
to protect victims of domestic violence while still returning them to the country of habitual residence for custody determinations. For a critical view of
these court-fashioned remedies, see Roxanne Hoegger, What If She leaves?
Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague Convention and the Insufficiency of
the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 183 (2003). Hoegger argues that these remedies are “illegal, dangerous, unfair, and inefficient.”
Id. She also argues that “return, as applied in domestic violence cases, denies
women’s autonomy, furthers cultural imperialism, and perpetuates class inequalities.” Id. As a result, she argues that the Hague Convention should
have an “explicit domestic violence defense” rather than the vague grave risk
exception. Id.
9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
10. Report on Compliance, supra note 1.
11. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, Letter of Transmittal From the White House to the Senate
of The United States [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal]. As of February 22,
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12
tional child abduction continues to be a major concern, many

2005, the Convention was in force between the United States and fifty-five
treaty partners. U.S. Dep’t of State Official Website, List of Hague Convention Signatory Countries at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_
issues/hague_issues_1487.html (last visited, Feb. 22, 2005). Additionally, a
number of other countries have acceded to the Convention, but have not yet
been accepted as partners by the United States. U.S. Dep’t of State Official
Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues, at http://travel.state.gov/family/
abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
The State Department has provided a great deal of information to help parents whose children have been abducted internationally on its website. U.S.
Dep’t. of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_578.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005). Whereas all of the original signatories of the Convention were obliged to accept all of the other original signatories, there is
now a review process for any new country that wants to be a party to the
treaty. U.S. Dep’t. of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction
Issues, at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_
568.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005). The review process gives every original
signatory the right to choose whether to accept the new member. U.S. Dep’t.
of State Official Website, Hague Convention Abduction Issues at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_568.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005). The stated rationale behind the review process is
that member states want to ensure that new members are willing to comply
with Convention so that it will be uniformly applied. See Report to Congress
on International Child Abductions in Response to the Statement of Managers
Accompanying F–103 Omnibus Appropriations Bill P.L. 108–07, available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_573.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
12. It is interesting to note that while international child abduction continues to be an area of major concern, neither the Hague Convention nor the
European Convention on Recognition of Children sought to address the criminal aspects of child abduction. HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 10.
While both of these conventions have sought to ensure that the home state’s
law is enforced, they have also tried to avoid having countries interpret and
question foreign law. Id. at 3. Perhaps the reason that there has not been an
agreement concerning criminal liability for international child abductions is
that the difficulty of interpreting foreign criminal law would pose too large a
problem. It has also been argued that the impact of criminal prosecutions or
threats of prosecution would not greatly benefit the abducted child. Jacqueline D. Golub, Note, The International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of
1993: The United States’ Attempt to Get Our Children Back—How is it Working?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 797, 812 (1999) (discussing commentary presented
at 1990 hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary). According to Golub:
Many opponents to the criminalization of international parental kidnapping feared that such a statute would actually impede the United
States’ ability to have its children returned from the international
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feel that the Hague Convention accomplished much of what it
set out to do.13 The Convention’s return remedy for parents
with rights of custody has proven to be quite successful, and “it
has dramatically advanced both the deterrence of international
abductions and the likelihood of having children returned.”14
Nevertheless, while the Convention has achieved many of its
initial goals, it still has an important flaw that has become
more evident since it was adopted.15

community. Supporters of the Hague Convention opposed the criminalization of international parental kidnapping, citing the success of
the Hague Convention as an encouraging end to the problem of parental abductions.
Id. While the U.S. Congress created the International Parental Kidnapping
Crime Act to establish international parental abduction as a criminal act, the
Act does not include cases where a child is illegally brought into the United
States. See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C.
§1204 (2005) [hereinafter IPKCA]. In addition, the United States has chosen
the Hague Convention as the preferred remedy, but the IPKCA can be used
under some circumstances, especially when children are abducted from the
United States to countries which are not a party to the Hague Convention.
United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 881–82 (2d Cir. 1997). While the Hague
Convention has been considered successful and is the preferred remedy in
returning children who are abducted internationally, it is, nevertheless, quite
possible that an agreement about international criminal liability for international child abductions would help deter international child abductions. For a
case where the United States sought to impose criminal liability after a parent was returned via a Hague proceeding see United States v. Ventre, 338
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003). In Ventre, the defendant tried to avoid criminal
liability by claiming that being held criminally liable after being subject to
Hague Convention proceedings would detract from the Hague Convention.
Ventre, 228 F.3d at 1051–52. However, as the court notes, “the IPKCA criminalizes the removal of a child to another country with the intent to obstruct
parental rights.” Id. at 1052. As a result of this law, parents who want to
interfere with another parent’s custody rights cannot simply choose to move to
a country that is not a signatory to the Hague Convention. This court also
finds that the IPKCA demonstrates that the United States appreciates the
seriousness of international child abduction. Therefore, the court holds that it
is appropriate to proceed with a criminal investigation even after one has been
returned pursuant to the Hague Convention. Id. at 1054.
13. According to the compliance report, “the Hague Abduction Convention,
when it works, works well. But the Convention is not uniformly applied in all
jurisdictions.” Report on Compliance, supra note 1.
14. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns
Twenty: Gender Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223
(2000).
15. Id. at 222.
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16
The Second Circuit’s decision in Croll v. Croll has received
17
much scholarly attention, and it is a good demonstration of one
18
of the Hague Convention’s main flaws. The Croll majority did
not view a noncustodial parent’s rights of access,19 even when
coupled with a ne exeat clause,20 to amount to rights of custody21
22
within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court held
that a ne exeat clause can protect rights of access as well as
rights of custody, but it does not change rights of access into
rights of custody.23 As a result, while the court found that Mr.
Croll had some limited remedies available to him under the
Hague Convention, he was not entitled to a return remedy.24
The Croll decision was quite controversial and has faced significant criticism.25 Judge Sotomayor, in her dissent, argued

16. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
17. See generally Christopher B. Whitman, Croll v. Croll: The Second Circuit Limits “Custody Rights” Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2001) (criticizing the Second Circuit’s narrow construction of the Hague Convention’s
text).
18. See generally Priscilla Steward, Note, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 308 (1997) (arguing that
the Hague Convention’s treatment of access rights has caused courts to misconstrue the Convention while attempting to meet its intent).
19. Under the Hague Convention, rights of access are quite similar to noncustodial visitation in the United States. According to the Convention, “rights
of access shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a
place other than the child’s habitual residence.” Hague Convention, supra
note 9, at art. 5b.
20. A ne exeat clause is defined as a "writ which forbids the person to
whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the
court." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990). In the context of this
case, the Hong Kong Family Court issued a ne exeat clause. Croll, 229 F.3d at
135. The goal of the ne exeat clause was to ensure that Mr. Croll maintained
his right of reasonable access. Id. The clause ordered the Crolls’ daughter,
Christina, to remain in Hong Kong until she was eighteen years old unless
she had her parents’ consent or if she was granted leave of the court. Id.
21. The Hague Convention determined that “rights of custody shall include
rights relating to the care of the person of the child, and, in particular, the
right to determine the child’s place of residence.” Hague Convention, supra
note 9, at art. 5a.
22. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id. at 143–44.
25. Whitman, supra note 17, at 626–27.
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that the ne exeat clause should have transformed Mr. Croll’s
rights of access into rights of custody.26 Sotomayor recognizes
that international case law has been split on whether the ne
exeat rights amount to rights of custody.27 Nevertheless, she
asserts that the majority ignored most other foreign courts’ interpretations of the Hague Convention by interpreting rights of
custody too narrowly.28 Judge Sotomayor believes that the

26. Croll, 229 F.3d at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Judge Sotomayor
points out that one of the purposes of the Hague Convention was to ensure
that the law of one Contracting State is respected in other Contracting States.
Id. Judge Sotomayor has a valid point that allowing a parent to take a child
abroad “in violation of ne exeat rights granted to the other parent by an order
from the country of habitual residence…nullifies that country’s custody law as
effectively as does the parent who kidnaps a child in violation of the rights of
the parent with physical custody.” Id. at 147. Additionally, Sotomayor points
out that “[t]o read the Convention so narrowly as to exclude the return remedy in such a situation would allow such parents to undermine the very purpose of the Convention.” Id.
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id. Judge Sotomayor points to the Family Court in Australia as an
example of a country interpreting rights of custody broadly:
Australia…has characterized the “spirit of the Convention” as ensuring “that children who are taken from one country to another wrongfully, in the sense of in breach of court orders or understood legal
rights, are promptly returned to their country so that their future can
properly be determined within that society.”
Id. (emphasis added). Based on this interpretation of the Hague Convention,
Australia recognized “rights of custody” in an otherwise noncustodial father.
In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina, Appeal no. 52, 1991 (Fam.) (Austl.), para. 26. On this issue, there seems
to be quite divergent opinions regarding the appeals court’s handling of relevant foreign case law. Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts
Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 378–79 (2001). For example, Reimann credits the
Croll case for attempting to take foreign law into account when interpreting
the Hague Convention. Id. However, Reimann also notes that the court may
not have found the foreign decisions to be that helpful due to the wide variety
of decisions in relative case law. Id. It seems that Reimann believes that the
court failed to use the foreign law properly in order to reach its decision, but
he did think that it was a step in the right direction for an American court to
look to foreign law when interpreting a treaty. Id. at 379. For an English
case where rights of custody under the Convention were construed in a more
broad fashion, see C. v. C., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng.) :
[The] right to give or withhold consent to any removal of the child
from Australia, coupled with the implicit right to impose conditions,
is a right to determine the child’s place of residence, and thus a right
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broader interpretation is more in accordance with the purpose
and structure of the Hague Convention.29
In addition to Judge Sotomayor, others have criticized the
Second Circuit for ignoring “compelling authority…with respect
to both case law and scholarship as well as to the interpretation
approved by the Special Commissions that review the operation
of the Child Abduction Convention.”30 Those who believe that
the court’s interpretation was too narrow argue that it was contrary to the Hague Convention’s overarching purpose.31 The
results of this decision can be far-reaching.32 In fact, some fear
it will lead more parents to kidnap their children because they
would not be as likely to be returned by a friendly forum.33
Even among those who support the substantive outcome of the
Croll decision, some have criticized the court for what they perceive to be a lack of deference to the existing international interpretations of the Hague Convention.34

of custody within the meaning of arts 3 and 5 of the convention…this
conclusion is in accordance with the objects of the convention.
Id.
29. Croll, 229 F.3d at 150.
30. Silberman, supra note 14, at 228–29.
31. See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private
th
International Law, 3 Acts and Documents of the 14 Session 426, 447 (1980).
Pérez-Vera, whose report is the official history and commentary of the Convention, indicates that the Convention’s intention was to protect all of the
ways that parents exercise child custody. Id. While some scholars choose to
argue that the recognition of all types of child custody shows intent upon the
framers of the Convention to include those with rights of access, it is clear
based on the definitions provided by the Convention that the distinction was
intended. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 5. However, given the fact
that Pérez-Vera also indicates that a child’s country is best suited to make
custody and access determinations, it is quite puzzling that the Convention
chose to make the distinction.
32. Deborah M. Huynh, Note, Croll v. Croll: Can Rights of Access Ever
Merit a Remedy of Return Under the Hague Abduction Convention?, 26 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 529, 557 (2001).
33. Id.
34. See Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and
Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
275, 281 (2002).
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While the Croll decision has received much valid criticism,
much of it is misdirected.35 In Croll, the majority accurately
36
interpreted and correctly applied the Hague Convention. The
decision, however, points out an inherent flaw in the Hague
Convention, namely that the Convention does not place enough
value on a noncustodial parent’s rights of access—especially
those who have agreements which contain a ne exeat clause.37
As a result, the drafters, unfortunately, did not give the judicial
or administrative authorities enough power to help enforce the
laws of the child’s habitual residence.38 Therefore, it is necessary to create an amendment to the Convention which will
grant noncustodial parents a remedy of return in situations
where the custodial parent has violated the noncustodial parent’s rights of access by removing the child from the child’s habitual residence,39 despite the existence of an order with a ne
35. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589. (“The right of access is,
of course, important, but, as we have seen, it was not intended to be given the
same level of protection by the Convention as custody.”).
36. Weiner, supra note 34, at 308. Weiner maintains that:
Croll reaches the right substantive result: a ne exeat clause does not
convert rights of access into rights of custody. Yet, Croll is still a
failure of American Hague Convention jurisprudence. Although I believe the substantive result was right, the opinion rests on, and emphasizes the Convention’s wording and the drafter’s intent, and pays
only minimal lip service to the purpose and design of the Convention
and case law from sister signatories.
Id.
37. Of course, some foreign courts have found that a ne exeat clause does
give a father veto power over a mother’s ability to move, and it confers on him
rights of custody. C. v. C., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng.) (Judgment of L.J. Neill).
However, even though some could argue that some foreign courts (even a majority) have come to a different conclusion than Croll, this still does not indicate that the Croll decision was wrong. After all, the main problem is the
interpretation of rights of custody, which may very well be different in different countries. In fact, the discrepancy provides even more support for the
notion that the Convention should have defined its terms to provide a better
way for determining what constitutes rights of custody.
38. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. (“Because courts in the United States have
jurisdiction to enforce the Convention by ordering a child’s return to her habitual residence only if the child has been removed in breach of a petitioning
parent’s custodial rights, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order return
in this case.”).
39. The Convention did not define the meaning of a child’s habitual residence, so it has been left up to the courts of the Contracting States to determine what makes a country a child’s habitual residence. Pérez-Vera, supra
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exeat clause issued by a valid judicial body located in the child’s
habitual residence.40
In Part II, this Note will describe the elements of the Hague
Convention as it is presently constituted and its available
remedies and exceptions. In Part III, this Note will examine
the Croll decision and will demonstrate that the court accurately recognized the distinction between rights of custody and
rights of access under the current Hague Convention. Part III
will also argue that while the Croll decision is technically correct, it illustrates a weakness in the Convention. In Part IV,
this Note will illustrate this weakness and suggest a solution by
exploring the different ways in which courts in the United
States have enforced court-ordered visitation, which demonstrate the high value placed on visitation by noncustodial parents. Part V will discuss how courts in foreign jurisdictions
have interpreted situations similar to the Croll case and argue
that these contrasting decisions further reveal an inherent
problem with the Convention. It will suggest that the Hague
note 31, at 441 (“The convention, following a long-established tradition of the
Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it.”). Therefore,
“many of the significant terms used by the Child Abduction Convention – habitual residence, custody rights, grave risk of harm – are inherently ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.” Silberman, supra note 14, at 246.
While different States may have different ways of determining the habitual
residence of a child, it is generally determined with regard to the physical
location of the child and the settled intention as to the residence of the custodial parent. HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 6. Nevertheless, habitual residence is a crucial question of fact that can determine whether a case
can be brought under the Hague Convention. Id.
40. However, it is also worth noting that the ne exeat clause need not be
the be all and end all. After all, since the best interests of a child are generally presumed to be better served by contact with both the custodial and noncustodial parents, there is no reason to limit the remedy of return to noncustodial parents. A remedy of return does not necessarily mean that the noncustodial parent will get custody of the child, and it does not mean that the
custodial parent will not be allowed to move. Instead, such a remedy would
merely ensure that the child’s home state would have the opportunity to make
the decision. As Weiner points out, “[n]owhere does the Convention suggest
that the remedy of return delivers the child to a custodial parent. In fact, the
Convention has no position on this issue, other than that the children are to
be returned typically to the habitual residence.” Weiner, supra note 34, at
320. Thus, a return remedy would likely lessen the incentive to move without
the consent of the noncustodial parent and the court’s permission.
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Convention would similarly benefit from placing a high value on
a noncustodial parent’s rights of access, that the Convention
should be amended to include some of the same remedies that
U.S. courts have made available to noncustodial parents. Finally, this Note will suggest that granting a return remedy to
parents with rights of access will help rectify the problems created by the Convention to better meet the Convention’s stated
objectives. While the return remedy will not always prevent a
person with custody from moving with his or her child, it will
make it more likely that the proper protocol will be followed. In
addition, it will provide the left-behind parent with an adequate
remedy for situations when the proper protocol is not followed.
II. THE HAGUE: ELEMENTS AND EXCEPTIONS
A. The Purpose of the Hague Convention
The express purpose of the Hague Convention (Convention) is
to protect the interests of children in custody matters by providing a method “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and to
ensure that the rights of custody and of access under the law of
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States.”41 The Convention considers removal or
retention to be wrongful when a parent removes a child from
his or her habitual residence in violation of the other parent’s
rights of custody.42

41. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 1. The Hague Convention was
created to “apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting
State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.” Id. at
art. 4.
42. Id. at art. 3. Article three states:
It is a breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution, or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before
the removal or retention; and at the time of the removal or retention
those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
Id.
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B. The Procedure Set Forth by the Hague Convention
When a child abduction has occurred, the Convention affords
the opportunity for a “requesting” Contracting State to make an
application on behalf of the person seeking return of a child
from another “requested” Contracting State.43 Each Contracting
State has established a central authority under the Convention
for the purpose of processing such applications, although the
way the central authorities have been set up differs in different
States.44 In the United States, a petitioner may file a petition
45
with a state trial court or Federal District Court. Different
states follow different rules and procedures, and there will also
be differences in the rules and procedures between state and
federal Court.46 After the filing of the petition, the Central Authority supports the petitioner by aiding the petitioner’s attorney.47 In addition, the Central Authority sends a letter written
by the State Department to the judge who will preside over the
hearing which informs the judge about the Convention and explains its impact.48 Generally, the procedures established by
the Convention have been successful at returning children who
have been wrongfully removed from their home state, especially
when compared with countries that are not parties to the Convention.49
C. Exceptions to the Remedy of Return
The Convention fashioned six narrow exceptions to the return
remedy even in cases where it was proven that a child had been

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 5, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See GEOFFREY L. GREIF & REBECCA HEGAR, WHEN PARENTS KIDNAP: THE
FAMILIES BEHIND THE HEADLINES 194–95 (1993). Greif and Hegar found that
eighty-four percent of the abductions to Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia resulted in recovery, whereas only forty-three percent of international abductions to non-Hague destinations led to recovery. Id. While there
are a number of other factors that may affect this difference in the rates of
recovery of abducted children, the Convention can certainly account for some
of those results.
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50
“wrongfully” removed or retained in a foreign country. Many
courts have been inclined to construe these exceptions narrowly
and thereby order the return of the child even when an exception has been established. These courts recognize that courts in
the “abducted-from country” are still equally or better suited to
determine the proper outcome of cases.51 Therefore, the courts
see little harm in returning a child to the courts of his or her
habitual residence for dispute resolution.52 In fact, the Conven-

50. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357–58
(M.D.Fla. 2002). These exceptions, which were created to protect the best
interests of the child, are as follows:
A court is not bound to order the return of a child if respondent demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) the person having
care of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the
time of removal or retention … or (2) the person having care of the
child had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or
retention of the child … or (3) “the child objects to being returned and
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate
to take account of its views.” … or (4) the proceedings were commenced more than one year after the date of the wrongful removal or
retention and “the child is now settled in its new environment.” …
Additionally, a court is not bound to order the return of a child if respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that: (5)
there is a grave risk that the child’s return would “expose the child to
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” … or (6) return of the child would not be permitted by fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. [However],
[e]ven if an exception is established, the Court has discretion to order
the return of a child if return would further the aims of the Hague
Convention.
Id. Note that inconsistent interpretations of article 13 are possible under the
Convention because:
The Child Abduction Convention does not define what constitutes a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation, nor at what age a child may decide for him or herself not to return, but rather depends upon the judge to make the determination
within the object and purpose of the Child Abduction Convention as a
whole.
Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the United
States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 285, 325 (2000).
51. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996).
52. For an explanation of the rationale behind the exceptions to the return
remedy, see Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 432.
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tion was not intended to settle disputes about legal custody
rights.53 Instead, the Convention was intended to “restore the
factual situation that existed prior to a child’s removal or retention”54 so as to ensure that an “international abductor [was] denied legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in the
country where the child is located.”55 Unfortunately, the Convention did not go far enough to ensure that international abductors would be denied legal advantage from their abductions.56 As the Croll case reveals, one can still escape the decree
of a child’s habitual residence by absconding from the country
as long as the parent they are leaving does not have rights of
custody.57
III. CROLL V. CROLL: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
A. The Facts of Croll
In Croll, Stephen Croll filed a petition to force his wife, Mei
Yee Croll, to return their child to Hong Kong under the Hague
58
Convention. Mr. and Mrs. Croll, who are both U.S. citizens,
59
got married in Hong Kong in 1982. Eight years later, Mrs.
Croll gave birth to their child, Christina, in Hong Kong, and
they lived there together for another eight years.60 In 1998, Mr.
61
and Mrs. Croll separated. Christina lived with her mother,
but she continued to see her father regularly.62 That same year,
Mr. Croll brought divorce proceedings in the District Court of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Matrimonial
Causes, and Mrs. Croll was granted “sole ‘custody, care and
control’ of Christina.”63 Mr. Croll, however, was to continue to
53. Letter of Transmittal, supra, note 11, at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. It is evident that the failure to provide a remedy for parents with
rights of access can have deleterious effects on a child regardless of whether a
child was removed from a parent with rights of custody or rights of access.
See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 428–29.
57. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
58. Id. at 134.
59. Id. at 135.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
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64
In order to ensure that
have a right of ‘reasonable access.’
there was no misunderstanding as to the meaning of the custody decree, the Hong Kong court inserted a ne exeat clause,
which stated that Christina could not leave Hong Kong until
she reached the age of eighteen65 without leave of the court or
66
consent by both parents.
On April 2, 1999, while Mr. Croll was away on a business
trip, Mrs. Croll and Christina traveled to New York City without leave of the court or Mr. Croll’s consent.67 Upon Mr. Croll’s
return, he was informed that his wife and child had gone to the
United States.68 When they had not returned more than a
month later, Mr. Croll filed a Hague petition in the Southern
District of New York in order to compel Christina’s return.69
When the case was brought in the District Court, both sides
agreed that Christina was a habitual resident in Hong Kong
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.70
Mrs. Croll also did not claim that her right to remove Christina
was based on one of the exceptions to the Convention’s return
remedy.71 Apparently, Mrs. Croll did not believe there was suf-

64. Id.
65. While the ne exeat clause provided that Christina could not leave until
she was eighteen years old, unless she had permission from her father or the
court, the Hague Convention only provides a return remedy for children under
sixteen years of age. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 4. Since Christina was only about eight years old at the time of the divorce, the Convention
obviously still applied to her. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. However, in jurisdictions where the courts decide to honor ne exeat clauses coupled with rights of
access, it will be interesting to see whether courts would also choose to honor
ne exeat clauses such as the one in Croll, which prohibits the noncustodial
parent from taking a child out of the country until she is over eighteen, or if
courts will limit the return remedy to children sixteen and under as provided
in the Convention. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 4. Since it is
much less common for a child near the age of majority to be kidnapped, this
may be a moot point. Either way, it is doubtful that a court would extend the
return remedy beyond the age of sixteen—even if there was a violation of a ne
exeat clause. Furthermore, since the Hague provides older children with the
opportunity to voice their opinions in order to avoid return, the problem might
be solved by asking the children’s preference in such a case.
66. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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ficient evidence to prove that Mr. Croll had failed to exercise his
custody rights or that he had consented to her leaving.72 In addition, Mrs. Croll did not attempt to show that there would be a
grave risk to Christina73 if she were forced to return to Hong
Kong.74 Instead, Mrs. Croll argued that Mr. Croll did not have
rights of custody over Christina and that he merely had rights
of access, thus, he was not entitled to relief in the Federal District Courts because the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-

72. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
73. See Weiner, supra note 34, at nn.214–17. In reality, at the trial court
level, Mrs. Croll attempted to enter evidence of domestic violence against herself and Christina. Id. Mrs. Croll alleged that she had previously attempted
to get an order of protection against her husband, and that she filed a complaint with the police alleging assault. Id. at n.214. Mrs. Croll also testified to
other instances of violence, including a fight that she alleged occurred in front
of Christina. Id. In addition, Mrs. Croll alleged that Christina had been
physically abused. Id. Nevertheless, the court never came to a factual determination as to whether Mr. Croll was a batterer, likely due in part to the fact
that the charges Mrs. Croll had brought were dismissed based on lack of evidence. Id. at n.216. Instead, the court ruled that Christina did not witness
any of the alleged abuse, so the evidence was not relevant to the Hague petition. Id. While the trial court did not seem to find the allegations of abuse
relevant, it is possible the allegations had an impact on the Second Circuit’s
decision. It is possible that since there is a difficult burden in establishing a
grave risk, the court may have found it easier to deny jurisdiction rather than
try to grant a grave risk exception to the return remedy.
74. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 13. The Hague Convention
provides that:
[T]he judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is
not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution, or
other body which opposes its return established that a person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not
actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal
or retention or there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place
the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative
authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds
that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its
views…the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child
provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the
child’s habitual residence.
Id.
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75
tion. The District Court, however, accepted Mr. Croll’s argument that the ne exeat clause provided by the Hong Kong Court
gave him the right to determine his child’s place of residence.76
The court then found that Mr. Croll’s right to determine Christina’s place of residence was equivalent to rights of custody
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.77 Since Christina’s removal from Hong Kong was deemed to be in violation of
her father’s rights of custody, her removal was found to be
wrongful within the meaning of the Convention.78
On appeal, the case was reviewed de novo in order to determine whether Mr. Croll had rights of custody or rights of access
within the meaning of the Hague Convention.79 The method for
interpreting treaties is similar to the method for interpreting
statutes.80 Since the issue of whether rights of access joined
with a ne exeat clause amounts to rights of custody under the
Hague Convention had never arisen before the Croll case, this
was a case of first impression.81 The Second Circuit distin-

75. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
76. Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Croll, 229 F.3d at 136.
80. Id. Here, the court explains that it must first look to the ordinary
meaning of the Convention. Id. If the ordinary meaning is ambiguous, the
court “may resort to extraneous tools of interpretations such as a treaty’s ratification history and subsequent operation.” Id.
81. Id. While this was a case of first impression, other federal courts have
subsequently addressed this issue. Fourth and Ninth Circuits both followed
Croll’s reasoning. See generally Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir.
2003) (reversing district court’s holding that Scottish law giving mother a
right to determine a child’s residence created a right of custody under the
Convention); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
ne exeat clause combined with visitation did not amount to right of custody
under the Convention). For a critical view of the Hague Convention and the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, see Sara J. Bass,
Note, Ne Exeat Clauses Proven Ineffective: How the Hague Convention Renders
Access Rights Illusory, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 573 (2004). Conversely,
the Eleventh Circuit chose not to accept Croll’s interpretation of rights of access. Instead, it found that a Norwegian father’s statutory ne exeat right coupled with a right of access amounted to a right of custody under Norwegian
law. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 715 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Given that the
goal of the Hague Convention is to deter international abduction, we readily
interpret the ne exeat right as including the right to determine the child’s
place of residence because the ne exeat right provides a parent with decisionmaking authority regarding the child’s international relocation.”). The court
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recognized that the parents in Norway had joint parental responsibility;
therefore, while Ms. Reeves could decide where in Norway the child could live,
she had to remain in Norway or get consent to move. Id. at 709. Since Ms.
Reeves did not ask permission to move beyond Norway, the court found the
removal to be wrongful under the Hague Convention, and it issued a return
order Id. at 710. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that:
In American courts, we tend to think of custody rights primarily in
the sense of physical custody of the child. However, in applying the
Hague Convention, we must look to the definition of “rights of custody” set forth in the Convention and not allow our somewhat different American concepts of custody to cloud our application of the Convention’s terms. Specifically, in this case we must think of “rights of
custody” as including “rights relating to the care of the person of the
child,” and in particular, “the right to determine the child’s place of
residence.”
Id. at 711. Interestingly, while the legal arguments put forth by the plaintiff,
Furnes, are similar to the arguments made in Croll and Gutierrez, the factual
backgrounds of the cases are quite different. In Furnes, the petitioner was
more sympathetic, and the defendant much less so. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 704
(“Plaintiff Furnes and Defendant Reeve’s relationship was marked by constant conflict. Defendant Reeves…commonly thwarted Plaintiff Furnes’s attempts to exercise his visitation rights. Defendant Reeves also made serious
allegations against Plaintiff Furnes…which were…groundless….In contrast,…Furnes was an understanding and cooperative parent and was able to
offer Jessica a secure home.”). Id. at 704–05. While the Eleventh Circuit does
construct valid arguments when interpreting Norwegian law, and these arguments are similar to those in Sotomayor’s passionate dissent in Croll, one
can still wonder if the courts in Croll, Gutierrez, and Furnes allowed the character traits of the litigants to affect their respective decisions. Clearly, this
would be the type of decision-making that the Convention tried to avoid.
Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 430 (“The Convention rests implicitly upon the
principle that any debate on the merits of the question, i.e. of custody rights,
should take place before the competent authorities in the State where the
child had its habitual residence prior to its removal.”). Id. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision addresses this concern by pointing out that they did not reach
the merits of the custody case, but rather it simply ordered that it be addressed in the child’s habitual residence prior to the abduction. Furnes, 362
F.3d at 721. The court also criticized the Croll decision:
Accordingly, our construction of the ne exeat right does not alter the
terms of the custody agreement. Rather, it simply would inconvenience Mrs. Croll as the custodial parent by requiring that she comply
with its terms. The Convention’s purpose is to prevent the international abduction of children and is thwarted, not satisfied, by the
Croll majority’s construction of the ne exeat right.
Id. While it is true that the main purpose of the convention is thwarted by
Croll’s interpretation, the Convention’s failure to adequately define rights of
access and rights of custody will continue to force courts to make their own
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guished rights of access from rights of custody and held that
Mr. Croll’s ne exeat clause did not elevate his rights of access to
rights of custody.82 As a result, the court denied having jurisdiction under the Convention and reversed the order to return
Christina to Hong Kong.83
In finding that Mr. Croll merely had rights of access, the
court rejected Mr. Croll’s argument that since “a ne exeat clause
gives an otherwise noncustodial parent a power that amounts to
‘a right to determine the child’s place of residence’ [and that
this clause] thereby creates a ‘right of custody’ that is protected
by the Convention’s return remedy.”84 While Mr. Croll was not
granted the return remedy that he desired, the court argued
that he was not without a remedy.85 On the contrary, pursuant
to one of the remedies under the Convention, the court suggested that Mr. Croll could obtain a “writ ordering the custodial
parent who has removed the child from the habitual residence
to permit, and to pay for, periodic visitation by the noncustodial
parent with access rights.”86 However, due to the great distance
between Hong Kong and New York City, it is unlikely that this
remedy will provide Mr. Croll with nearly the same amount of
visitation as he enjoyed pursuant to the Hong Kong divorce
agreement.87 Therefore, this alternative is not only unrealistic,
but unreasonable.
individual interpretations of foreign law until an amendment is created or a
common definition becomes accepted.
82. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
83. Id. at 135–36.
84. Id. at 139.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 138.
87. Eric S. Horstmeyer, Note, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their
Impact on its Efficacy, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 125, 127 (1994). Horstmeyer
recognizes the Convention’s flaw when it comes to enforcing a noncustodial
parents’ visitation rights. Id. at 127. (“The Court was unable to fashion a
remedy for the noncustodial parent because of his indigent status and his
inability to fund his legal visitation in a foreign country. This decision illustrates the Convention’s glaring weakness in terms of its ability to protect
rights of access adequately.”). While Horstmeyer has a strong argument that
the courts have failed to interpret the Convention carefully enough to make it
effective, this problem is further elucidated in Croll, due to the fact that the
child was taken in violation of a ne exeat clause. Therefore, even if one were
to argue that the father in Viragh v. Foldes, should not be entitled to a return
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B. Analysis of Court’s Interpretation of Custody Rights versus
Access Rights
The Second Circuit correctly distinguished rights of custody
from rights of access in accordance with Article 5 of the Hague
Convention.88 Custody rights are those “rights relating to the
care of the person of the child, and, in particular, the right to
determine the child’s place of residence.”89 Rights of access,
however, are defined as “the right to take a child for a limited
period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”90 This distinction is quite important since the Convention only deems a removal to be wrongful where one has violated custody rights.91 Therefore, a parent with mere access
rights cannot seek the return of the child for violation of these
rights.92 Instead, a parent with access rights may attempt to
prevent the breach of access rights by applying to the Central
Authority of a Contracting State.93 The treaty, however, is silent regarding remedies for noncustodial parents whose rights
of access have been obstructed.94 Given the fact that “unlawful
remedy because he did not have rights of custody, the ne exeat clause coupled
with rights of custody surely should be enough to warrant a return remedy.
Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).
88. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 5.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Silberman, supra note 14, at 225.
92. Id.
93. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6.
94. Viragh, 612 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Mass. 1993). Viragh acknowledges that:
[N]ations are instructed in art. 21 to “promote the peaceful enjoyment
of access rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject,” as well as to “take steps to remove, as far as possible all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.”
Id. In this case, the court found that even though the “children’s presence in
the United States makes practically impossible the exercise of the precise
visitation schedule ordered by the Guardianship Authority [t]hat, however,
does not mean that [the noncustodial parent] is prevented from effectively
exercising his access rights to the children in the United States.” Id. at n.9.
This finding, however, should be questioned for it shows a lack of respect for
the Guardianship authority in Budapest, and it seems as though it is letting
the United States substitute its own decision for the decision in the habitual
residence of the child. Whereas the Budapest Guardianship Authority determined that it would be in the best interests of the children for Mr. Gabor to
have visitation on “alternate weekends, two weeks each in July and August,
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unilateral removals – as well as real abductions – are harmful
to children, whether the parent who removes is a mother or a
father,”95 there is no valid reason for the Hague Convention to
distinguish between rights of access and rights of custody.96
and three days during the children’s winter and spring holiday,” the U.S.
court decided that other arrangements could be equally in the best interests of
the child. Id. In Viragh, there was not a ne exeat clause. However, Hungarian law requires custodial parents to get permission from the noncustodial
parent or the court before permanently removing a child from Hungary. Id. at
246. Clearly, such a law would have the same effect as a ne exeat clause.
Nevertheless, since the court recognized that the Convention was silent with
regard to rights of access, and since the court probably did not want to be
involved in interpreting Hungarian law, the court did not grant the return
remedy. Horstmeyer, supra note 87, at 138. It should also be noted that Mrs.
Foldes had good reason for leaving Hungary without notifying Mr. Viragh,
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had some good reasons for
wanting to deny a return remedy:
Gabor had not been a model husband. He physically abused and verbally threatened Maria [Mrs. Foldes] on a number of occasions both
prior to and following the divorce, one time attacking her when she
was seven months pregnant with their second child. At the time
Maria requested the divorce, Gabor was so distressed that he threatened to kill himself and the two children and also told Maria that, if
she continued with her divorce action, she would never see the children again….She also believed….that Gabor would file a new law suit
or petition for custody thus forcing her to remain in Hungary to appear and answer new allegations. It was Maria’s understanding that
she would not be permitted to fly overseas during the last three
months of pregnancy, and therefore any potential litigation in Hungary would result in her separation from Mihaly [her new husband]
until after the birth of her child.
Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 244. While there is certainly a compelling argument
that Mrs. Foldes should not have been returned to Hungary, it would still
show more respect for international law to have denied the return remedy
based on the grave risk exception to the Convention. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at art. 13b. Unfortunately, since the burden of proving a grave
risk is so difficult, and since the Convention does not give a return remedy
unless the left-behind parent has a right of access, the court did not choose to
follow this route. Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 243.
95. Silberman, supra note 14, at 225 (citations omitted).
96. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31 at 432. Pérez-Vera noted that:
[I]n the literature devoted to a study of this problem, ‘the presumption generally stated is that the true victim of the ‘childnapping’ is
the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in
charge of his upbrining, the uncertainty and frustration which come
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Similarly, since the Convention’s goal was “to restore the factual situation that existed prior to a child’s removal or retention,”97 the Convention should allow the courts to do just that.
The court in Croll, however, was limited by the Convention’s
distinction between rights of custody and rights of access so it
did not have the jurisdictional authority to issue a return remedy.98 Since the Hong Kong courts had implemented the ne
exeat clause into the Croll’s divorce, when Mrs. Croll wanted to
alter the divorce agreement, she should have attempted to have
it altered in Hong Kong. As the dissenting judge in Croll
pointed out, because Mrs. Croll was required to remain in Hong
Kong, this “impliedly gave the [Hong Kong] court and the parent without physical custody the right to veto an international
move, [and] it vested both with the power to determine the
child’s residence.”99 However, due to the distinction between
rights of access and rights of custody under the Convention, the
court was powerless to issue a return remedy, which would
have been the proper solution under the circumstances.
C. Remedies Granted to Parents with Rights of Access
Under the Hague Convention, a parent who merely has rights
of access cannot file a petition claiming that there was a wrongful removal.100 If there is no allegation or evidence of wrongful
removal or retention outside the country of habitual residence,
then the District Courts do not have “independent authority to
with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural
conditions and unknown teachers and relatives.’
Id.
97. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at preamble.
98. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 445. Pérez-Vera explains:
Although the problems which can arise from a breach of access rights,
especially where the child is taken abroad by its custodian, were
raised during the Fourteenth Session, the majority view was that
such situations could not be put in the same category as the wrongful
removals which it is sought to prevent.
Id. Here, it is evident that the drafters of the Convention considered eliminating any distinction between rights of custody and rights of access, but chose
not to do so. Therefore, while the court in Croll correctly interpreted the Convention, this illustrates the drafter’s misconception of what is in the best interests of the child.
99. Croll, 229 F.3d at 151.
100. Id. at 135.
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101
remedy the situation.” However, this is not supposed to leave
the left-behind parent completely without recourse.102 Instead,
the left-behind parent may file a claim for visitation rights in
state court under the state’s visitation statute.103 The Convention also allows the petitioner to file a petition with the Central
Authority to aid in his or her request for the enforcement of
visitation.104 Unfortunately, however, the remedies presented to
105
a noncustodial parent are insufficient; they do not adequately
serve the interests of justice, they may not be in the best inter-

101. Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998). As the
court notes in Terron v. Ruff, No. 48683-7-1, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 456, at
*7 (Wash. 2003), “In 1988, the United States Congress adopted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. § 11601, in order to
implement the Convention. ICARA establishes specific burdens of proof for
the parent seeking the return of the child under the Convention and for parents opposed to the child’s return.” Id. The standard of evidence to prove
wrongful removal of a child is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id.
102. Terron, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 456, at n.4 (“A separate provision,
Article 21, provides that a party may apply to secure the ‘effective exercise of
rights of access.’ In addition, the Convention imposes an obligation on Central
Authorities to ‘make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective
exercise of rights of access.’”).
103. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 862. The court in Bromley expressed one
rationale for refusing jurisdiction in the federal courts:
The arena of child custody matters, except for the limited matters of
international abduction expressly addressed by the Convention,
would be better handled by the state courts which are more numerous and have both the experience and resources to deal with this special area of the law. There is a growing trend towards establishing
specialized state family courts, which avoid a piecemeal approach to
domestic relations problems.
Id. Unfortunately, however, this remedy is unlikely to be satisfactory due to
the lack of power to issue a return remedy. While the left-behind parent can
file for visitation, it may be very difficult for the visitation actually to occur.
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, this may be a suitable outcome.
104. See Janzik v. Schand, No. 99 C 6515, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17154
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2000).
105. Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction:
A Brief Analysis and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAMILY L.Q. 9, 11 (1994). (“The
Convention does not offer uniform international standards for determining
custody rights.”). This failure makes it difficult for courts to determine
whether a return remedy should be granted and forces the requested State to
determine whether there were rights of custody under the requested State’s
law when it is supposed to be enforcing determinations in the requesting
State.
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ests of the child, and they do not serve the purpose of the
treaty.106
IV. DOMESTIC POLICY REGARDING VISITATION AND RELOCATION
A. Presumption in Favor of Noncustodial Visitation
In order to propose a solution to the problem presented by the
Croll case, this Note will examine how courts in the United
States address similar issues. In general, U.S. domestic policy
supports the idea that it would be unfair and contrary to the
best interests of the child to prevent a noncustodial parent from
visitation “absent exceptional or compelling circumstances.”107
This is due to the recognition that a child is likely to be harmed
by a custodial parent’s choice to separate the child from a parent who has been granted rights of access.108 The rationale is
that “visitation is a right jointly enjoyed by the noncustodial
parent and the child and that interest is served best when ‘nur106. See GREIF & HEGAR, supra note 49, at 183–87.
107. Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 920, 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). In
Pecorello, the court states that “absent exceptional or compelling circumstances, a geographic relocation by a custodial parent which will effectively
deny a noncustodial parent visitation will not be permitted.” Id. at 920–21.
In the Pecorello case, however, the court found that the custodial parent’s
remarriage of a divorced parent was an exceptional circumstance and allowed
her to relocate. Id. Unlike in Pecorello, in the Croll case, however, Mrs. Croll
did not remarry and would be unable to demonstrate such an exceptional circumstance. Similarly, the Hague Convention has a system in place to prevent
against returning an abducted child to a noncustodial parent:
Nothwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the judicial
or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution, or other body
which opposes its return establishes that…b there is a grave risk that
his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, art 13b, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. In addition, the Hague Convention “may
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” Id. Therefore, there is no harm in extending the remedy of return based on rights of access barring such exceptional
circumstances that are protected against in article 13b, but there is a harm in
setting the dangerous precedent that will allow a custodial parent to move
away from a noncustodial parent on a personal whim.
108. See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 428.
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109
tured by regular, frequent and welcomed visitation.’” Because
of the value that courts place on a noncustodial parent’s rights
to visitation, there is a “heavy burden of proving exceptional
circumstances or pressing concerns for the welfare of the custodial parent or the child which would warrant relocation.”110

B. Best Interests of the Child
Due to the presumption that contact with both parents is in
the best interests of a child, if Mrs. Croll had been divorced in
the United States, it is unlikely that the court would have
viewed her decision to move as being justified by exceptional
circumstances. In fact, when Mrs. Croll brought Christina to
the United States, she claimed that she only intended to remain
for a few weeks.111 Therefore, her decision to make a short visit
to the United States would not likely lead one to the conclusion
that there was a pressing concern or exceptional circumstance
requiring the move—even if one were to believe her testimony
that she thought about remaining permanently.112 After all, if
the move was motivated by some pressing concern, Mrs. Croll
likely would have known when she left Hong Kong that she was
leaving for good. Either way, it was clear that if she intended to
move, the Hong Kong court required her to get consent from
either Mr. Croll or from the court itself.113
In the United States, when the court attempts to determine
the best interests of the child and whether to let a divorced parent relocate with his or her child, no single factor or circumstance is controlling.114 On the contrary, the court must balance
many factors in deciding the best interests of the child.115 The
109. Pecorello, 142 A.D. 2d at 921 (Pine and Balio, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
110. Id. at 921.
111. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
112. Id. at 135.
113. Id.
114. Pecorello, 142 A.D.2d at 922.
115. Id. While the court in Pecorello found there to be exceptional circumstances, there does seem to be a trend in American family law towards allowing parents to relocate and modify their visitation arrangements with less
than exceptional circumstances. Enrico A. Mazzoli, Note, The Court’s Role
Facilitating an Effective Relationship Between Noncustodia Parent and Child
When the Custodial Parent Relocates with Child, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 259, 262
(1999). Courts are increasingly prone to changing the standard for allowing a
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Hague Convention, however, does not specifically provide for an
move from the exceptional circumstances standard to the best-interests-ofthe-child standard. Id. Additionally, more courts are finding that it is in the
best interests of the child to move. Id. While the courts have moved towards
allowing custodial parents to move for good reasons, this is not to say that is a
forgone conclusion. In McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1987), the
court denied a mother’s motion to move closer to her parents and sisters with
her child away from the noncustodial parent even though she had been offered
a job in her new town. McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508, 510 (N.D. 1987).
Taking into account the fact that the job did not pay significantly more than
her current job, the court found that the mother had failed to prove the move
was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 508, 510–11. Clearly, these cases
show that there is a high burden to prove a move to be in the best interests of
the child. As the dissent in McRae points out, however, visitation orders can
be modified. Id. at 513. Therefore, the recent trend seems to be to allow the
move but to modify the visitation arrangement to protect. See Edwin J. (Ted)
Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward, or Moving Backward, 15 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 169 (1998). Terry points out that:
Courts that traditionally have taken a very restrictive view of relocation have recently retreated from their previously entrenched positions against allowing a primary custodian to move to another location with his or her children. In highly publicized cases from California and New York, the highest courts of both states enunciated new
standards for determining the outcome of relocation cases. The fact
patterns and the court’s holdings are noteworthy because they signal
some important changes in how relocation cases are being handled
from coast to coast.
Id. Terry also points out that much of the difficulty that the courts have in
deciding whether to let custodial parents relocate with their children is that
there are two different theories proposed by social and forensic scientists
about how to protect children of divorce from emotional scarring. Id. at 167–
68. Terry notes that:
One holds that children need both of their parents and prosper socially and emotionally when both parents remain actively involved in
their lives…The second proposition is that while children need contact with both parents, the quality of the relationship between the
noncustodial parent and the child may be far more important than
daily contact between them, and further, that the child’s well-being is
affected more by the stability of the new family unit – including the
happiness and adjustment of the custodial parent.
Id. at 168. Regardless of which proposition one believes is more accurate and
beneficial to the child, certainly these matters should be decided on a case-by
case-basis. In any event, “the clear trend today favors standards allowing
modifications to accommodate relocation by the parent with primary custody,
so long as the relocation occurs in good faith.” Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S.
Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 40 (2002).
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116

inquiry into the best interests of the child. While the ultimate
decision regarding custody, visitation, and the best interests of
the child should ultimately be left up to the home state, the
Convention should allow the requested state to perform a best
interests test in considering whether a child to be returned to
his or her home state.117 However, since the court has no authority to consider the best interests of the child in cases where
parents have rights of access, the court in Croll must refuse
jurisdiction.
By refusing to return Christina to Hong Kong for a determination as to whether it would be in her best interests to move
away from her father to the United States, there was no inquiry
into what was in her best interests.118 As a result, by allowing a
parent with rights of custody to move without the consent of the
parent with rights of access or the permission of the courts, the
child’s best interests may be endangered without an inquiry
into whether there was a sufficient reason to relocate and
thereby disrupt the noncustodial parent’s regular rights of access. In Croll, the court does not attempt to see whether there

116. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 431. “While the Convention does not
specifically address the interests of the child, it “upholds unequivocally the
idea that access rights are the natural counterpart of custody rights, a counterpart which must in principle be acknowledged as belonging to the parent
who does not have custody of the child.” Id. at 432. Clearly, if the Convention
viewed access rights to be such an important counterpart, then it must be
amended in such a way that it can actually protect such rights.
117. This best interests test would not be to decide who should be awarded
custody ultimately. Pérez-Vera, in her commentary to the Convention points
out some of the problems with having the abducted-to countries performing
best interests test and making custody determinations:
[W]e cannot ignor[e] the fact that recourse by internal authorities to
such a notion involves the risk of their expressing particular cultural,
social, etc. attitudes which themselves derive from a given nationally
community and thus basically imposing their own subjective value
judgments upon the national community from which the child has recently been snatched.
Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 431.
118. Actually, it is likely that the best interests of the child were determined
in Hong Kong, for it is unlikely the Hong Kong matrimonial court would have
included a ne exeat clause if they thought it was contrary to the child’s best
interests. Therefore, the problem is not that there was no best interests test,
but, rather, that a parent is allowed to act contrary to a best interests determination.
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was any proof of educational, health or economic need to relocate. Therefore, the Convention leaves all of the power in determining the best interests to Mrs. Croll simply by removing
Christina from the home State.119
Whereas the Convention gives sole power to the custodial
parent to decide where a child can live by failing to fashion a
return remedy for violation of a parent’s rights of access, in
many parts of the United States, noncustodial parents have a
statutory right to reasonable visitation as well as decisionmaking power with regard to the residence of their child.120 In
fact, some courts refer to a noncustodial parent’s right to visitation as a natural right.121 Courts and legislatures recognize that
reasonable visitation (unless proven otherwise) is in the best
interests of the child.122 While the right of visitation is not
unlimited, visitation requirements must be in the best interests
of the child.123 Therefore, if a court is to grant stringent visita-

119. Ironically, it is courts’ inability under the Convention to consider a
child’s best interests which has been credited with making the Convention a
success. Marguerite C. Walter, Note, Toward the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Transnational Parent-Child Contact, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV 2381, 2386 (2004) (“It is the Abduction Convention’s simplicity, along
with its purposeful avoidance of the difficult underlying issue of the best interests of the child, that is largely responsible for its success in attracting a
large number of States Parties and in achieving a high level of returns of abducted children.”).
120. Adamson v. Chavis, 672 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Section 61.13(2)(b)(1)., Florida Statutes (1994). Here, the statute
provides that:
It is public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has
frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents
separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. After
considering all relevant facts, the father of a child shall be given the
same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child.
Id.
121. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. 1983). In Maxwell, the
parent seeking visitation rights was an out-of-wedlock parent, but the court
still found that parents are entitled to visitation even if they are not the legitimate parents of a child. Id. at 377.
122. Id. at 379.
123. Id. at 377. “The presumption in favor of visitation can only be overcome
by conclusive evidence that the parent has forfeited his right of access by his
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tion requirements, they too must be in the best interests of the
child.124
As a result of the great distance between New York and Hong
Kong, reasonable visitation is unlikely to be feasible.125 Mrs.
Croll’s actions, therefore, have created a situation similar to
those where stringent visitation is granted. However, since
there is no evidence that stringent visitation is in Christina’s
best interests, this situation is not only unfair to Mr. Croll, but
it may very well be detrimental to Christina.126 In addition, this
power gives Mrs. Croll the discretion to decide how, when, and
if visitation occurs. Public policy should not award such decision-making power to the custodial parent. This type of power
would seem to encourage visitational vigilantism rather than
enforce the belief that custodial parents must have a respect for
the law of their home State. In order to prevent this from occurring, there should be an amendment to the Convention
which would allow the possibility of a return remedy for parents
who have rights of access coupled with ne exeat clauses so that
the court in the child’s habitual residence can make sure that
relocation is in the best interests of the child.

conduct or that exercise of the right would injuriously affect the child’s welfare.” Id. at 379.
124. Id. at 378.
125. See generally Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993). In Viragh, the court found itself unable to fashion a remedy for the noncustodial
parent due to the fact that he was indigent and unable to pay for trips to visit
his child. Horstmeyer, supra note 87, at 138 (discussing Viragh v. Foldes, 612
N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993). While it is not necessarily the case that Mr. Croll is
indigent, it is clear that continued visitation between the United States and
Hong Kong would prove to be quite costly and could utterly frustrate his right
of access. Croll, 229 F.3d at 142.
126. Maxwell, 434 So. 2d at 379.
Visitation is important for a child’s whole growth, mental, physical
and spiritual and a denial of visitation can make a child feel rejected
and confused. The child’s experience of family continuity and connection is a basic and fundamental ingredient of his sense of self, of his
sense of personal significance and his sense of identity. While a child
is cut off from one of his parents…there is, for the child and the parent…a mutual sense of deep personal loss.
Id.
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C. Modification of Visitation Agreements
Some states seek to ensure that the trial court visitation
agreements are fair by providing trial courts with the statutory
right to modify visitation rights if such a modification would be
in the best interests of the child.127 One recognized basis for
such modification is when there has been a change of circumstances.128 For example, in Missouri, if a custodial parent moves
a considerable distance from a noncustodial parent, it can be
deemed a change of circumstances, and the court may adjust
visitation to meet the best interests of the child.129 In Dover v.
Dover, when a custodial parent moved more than two hundred
miles away from the noncustodial parent, the court recognized
that such a long distance impeded the noncustodial parent’s
visitation because it could diminish the quality of visitation and
lead to resentment on the part of the child, the parent, or
both.130 As a result, the court modified the visitation schedule in
order to make sure that it created the best opportunity for
meaningful contact with that parent.131 This decision was due
to Missouri’s presumption that “frequent and meaningful communication with both parents is in the child's best interest.”132
Another way of illustrating how courts value visitation rights
is to examine how difficult it is to lose such rights. In West Virginia, for example, visitation may be suspended only under the
most severe circumstances, such as in cases of sexual abuse or
aggravated domestic violence.133 However, even in cases where
visitation was interrupted due to sexual abuse and aggravated
domestic violence, the courts have attempted to maintain the
bond between noncustodial parents and their children.134 In
Hawk v. Hawk, the court did this by restoring supervised visitation as soon as it was no longer deemed detrimental to the
child’s well-being and if the noncustodial parent agreed to fam127. Dover v. Dover, 930 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 496.
132. Id.
133. Dover, 930 S.W.2d at 496. See Hawk v. Hawk 506 S.E.2d 85, 88 (W. Va.
1998) (“Total suspension of visitation is justified only under the most severe
circumstances.”).
134. Id.
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135
In fact, even in cases where the parily therapy counseling.
ent has had his or her parental rights terminated due to neglect
or abuse, the court recognizes the importance of a strong bond
between a parent and a child and may continue to allow visitation.136
In the Croll decision, there is no discussion of abuse or neglect,137 and it is clear that Mr. Croll had been exercising his
138
rights of access. However, as we can see from domestic policy,
even if there had been abuse or neglect, there could still have
been reason to believe that it was in Christina’s best interests
to maintain ties with her father.139 Due to the courts’ predilection towards allowing the noncustodial parent to maintain constant contact with the child, it is not surprising that courts are
also reticent to permit the removal of a child from the jurisdiction without the noncustodial parent’s consent.140 Some courts
have found that before a court will permit the removal of a minor child from the jurisdiction, “the custodial parent must satisfy the court that there is a legitimate reason for leaving the
state and that it is in the minor child's best interests to con-

135. Id.
136. In re Katie S. v. David S., 479 S.E.2d 589, 601 (W. Va. 1996). The court
noted that:
Circuit courts should be aware that post-termination visitation, either with siblings or parents, may be in the best interest of the child,
especially when there is a close bond and the child maintains love
and affection for either her siblings or parents. Where no bond exists,
the consideration of post-termination visitation is not required. When
parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit
court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the
best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuit court shall
consider whether a close emotional bond has been established between parent and child and the child's wishes, if he or she is of appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate
that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to
the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest.
Id.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Weiner, supra note 34.
Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d at 601.
Id.
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141
It is unlikely that the Croll
tinue to live with that parent.”
case would have met this standard since the mother testified
that she did not even know that she was going to stay in the
United States.142

D. Federal Statutes Aimed At Parental Abductions
While the rules regarding international child abduction are
quite complex and require the cooperation of courts from different countries to interpret the Hague Convention, parental child
abduction has also been a challenge for the courts within the
United States. Therefore, Congress enacted a number of statutes in order to deter the abduction or unilateral removal of
children by parents in order to obtain custody awards.143 The
141. See Parisien v. Parisien, No. A-98-894, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS 191, at
*35 (Neb. Ct. App. July 6, 1999). See McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508, 509
(N.D. 1987). The Mcrae court noted:
Where the noncustodial parent has been given and has exercised visitation rights, the custodial parent has the burden of securing an order for a change of residence of the child to another state by demonstrating that it is in the best interests of the child to do so. There is a
legally recognizable right of visitation between a child and the noncustodial parent, which is considered to be in the best interests of the
child. The statutory recognition of visitation rights between a child
and the noncustodial parent is consistent with placing the burden
upon the custodial parent to show that moving the child to another
state is in the child's best interest. There is no presumption that a
custodial parent's decision to change a child's residence to another
state is in a child's best interests.
McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509.
142. Mrs. Croll’s testimony that she did not plan on staying in the United
States is questionable because she did admit that “‘in the back of her mind’
she intended to remain in the United States permanently.” Croll, 229 F.3d at
135. However, since the court accepts her testimony, for the purposes of this
Note, her testimony should be accepted as true.
143. Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A.2d 202, 204 (Me. 1983) (citing Congressional Findings and Declarations of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–611, § 7(c)(6)) [hereinafter PKPA]. From
Peterson, it is clear that one of the goals of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the PKPA was to avoid a race to the courthouse effect. Id. By
instituting a home state requirement, the statutes take away the incentive for
a parent to take a child to a foreign jurisdiction in order to get a custody decree. Id. Therefore, in Peterson, even though the father filed first in Maine,
the state did not actually have jurisdiction over the case, so it could not bar
the mother from filing for custody in the child’s home state. Id.
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which was
later modified by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) have some of the same stated goals as the
Hague Convention, but they attempt to meet those goals in different ways.144
1. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Under the UCCJA, the state that makes an initial custody
decree (assuming it had jurisdiction to do so) maintains continuing jurisdiction as long as one of the parties remains in that
145
state. The Supreme Court of Washington in Greenlaw v.
Smith146 effectively protects and preserves the jurisdiction of its
trial court even in situations where a child has established a

144. In Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96–611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3568, Congress found
that:
[I]t is necessary to establish a national system for locating parents
and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another and are
concealed in connection with such disputes, and to establish national
standards under which the courts of such jurisdictions will determine
their jurisdiction to decide such disputes and the effect to be given by
each such jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other jurisdictions.
Id. Congress indicated the general objectives of the PKPA were to:
[P]romote cooperation between State courts to the end that a determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can
best decide the case in the interest of the child; promote and expand
the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between States which are concerned with the same child; facilitate the
enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister states; discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family
relationships for the child; avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters of child custody and visitation
which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from State
to State with harmful effects on their well being; and deter interstate
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody and visitation awards.
Id.
145. Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994).
146. Id.
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147
new “home state” under the UCCJA. Therefore, even if the
child has moved to a new home state, the old state has jurisdiction over the case, and it may modify the decree as it sees fit.148
Greenlaw holds that as long as one of the parents remains and
the child maintains sufficient contact with the state, no parent
can simply escape its jurisdiction by moving to another state.149
As the court in Greenlaw notes, “interpreting the UCCJA to allow an automatic shift in modification jurisdiction simply because a child establishes a new home state would not further
the purposes of the Act as it would permit forum shopping and
instability of custody decrees.”150 This interpretation makes
sense because it eliminates instability and also prevents parents from benefiting from their bad actions.151 After all, if one
were to remove one’s child without consent and in violation of
the court order, it would be unfair for the place where the parent moves to get home state jurisdiction.152 The court does not

147. Under the UCCJA, a state is considered to be the “home state” if it is
where the child lived for at least six consecutive months with his or her parents. Id. at n.4
148. Id. at 1024.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1033. Thus, the court interprets the UCCJA and PKPA:
[T]o mean that jurisdiction to modify a custody decree continues with
the decree state so long as: 1) that state’s decree is entered in compliance with the UCCJA and PKPA; 2) one of the parents or other contestants continues to reside in the decree state; and 3) the child continues to have more than slight contact with the decree state. The
child’s continued visitation with the parent who remains in the decree state may constitute more than slight contact within the decree
state.
Id.
151. Greenlaw, 869 P.2d at 1033.
152. This is not to say that the home state jurisdiction will never change. It
would still behoove the parent in the left-behind state to file for custody
quickly in the home state and to maintain contact with the child so that the
court will not voluntarily give up its jurisdiction to the new state. This is
because “even though a decree state has jurisdiction to modify its own decree,
that state is not required to retain jurisdiction if another state appears to be a
more appropriate, more convenient forum.” Id. Since Mr. Croll filed in a
short period of time, there is no reason to think that the Hong Kong Court
would choose not to exercise its jurisdiction. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. While he
may not have continued to visit with his child, this is more due to the fact that
visitation became impracticable, and it would be unfair to penalize him by
saying that Christina no longer had slight contact with Hong Kong.
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distinguish between reasonable visitation rights and custody
rights but, rather, seeks to enforce them both equally because
they are both legitimate concerns and should be considered
equally important.
2. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
The PKPA was also designed to eliminate some of the same
problems caused by interstate child kidnapping, such as forum153
Congress also had
shopping and conflicting state decrees.
policy reasons for wanting to penalize parents for attempting to
evade custody decrees by taking children out of their home
state.154 While the PKPA was not created to grant or deny initial jurisdiction, it was created to ensure that the issuing state
court would be granted full faith and credit to the custody decrees of other states.155 When it comes to jurisdiction, preference is initially granted to the child’s home state under the
PKPA.156 However, if no state has home state jurisdiction, another state may take jurisdiction as long as it has a significant
connection to the child and either of the parties.157 The reasoning behind allowing states to take emergency jurisdiction over
cases is to ensure that there will be a forum in order to protect
the best interests of the child.158
E. Domestic Remedies for Enforcing Visitation Agreements
In cases where a parent attempts to circumvent a court’s decision, as the mother did in Croll, courts in the United States
take the responsibility of enforcing visitation agreements seriously. As the New Jersey state court noted:
It is well settled that the law favors visitation and protects
against the thwarting of visitation rights….The courts should
endeavor that children of separated parents should be imbued

153. For a comprehensive review of the circumstances leading up to the
enactment of the PKPA, see Ann T. Wilson, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Is There An Enforcement Role For The Federal Courts?, 62 WASH L.
REV. 841 (1987).
154. 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 960 (2003).
155. Id.
156. Greenlaw, 869 P. 2d at 1024.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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with love and respect for both parents, and where children are
in custody of one parent, the court should endeavor to effect
this facet of the children's welfare by conferring reasonable
rights of visitation of the other parent. Accordingly, when one
parent willfully violates the visitation of the other parent, the
159
court must act swiftly and affirmatively.

One of the most drastic ways that the court may act to ensure
that its decisions are followed is to order a change of custody.160
In Clark v. Bullard, Mrs. Bullard had been awarded permanent
custody of their child and moved to Florida without Mr. Clark’s
consent or knowledge.161 When this occurred, Mr. Clark made a
motion for a change of custody which was denied.162 However,
on appeal, the State Supreme Court added that if Mrs. Bullard
continued to thwart Mr. Clark’s visitation, the trial court could
reconsider the motion to change custody.163 While Mrs. Bullard
remained in Florida, she continued to evade Mr. Clark, and he
could not locate his child for six months, whereupon he again
moved for a change of custody.164 Mr. Clark served Mrs. Bullard’s attorney, but the attorney was unable to contact Mrs.
Bullard about the hearing.165 After a hearing, the court ordered
a change of custody, and Mr. Clark was given custody of his
child.166 Then Mrs. Bullard returned to Minnesota and moved
for relief based on the fact that she had not been notified of the
hearing, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case for a full evidentiary hearing.167
After the trial, the court found that Mrs. Bullard had done
everything possible to frustrate Mr. Clark’s visitation privileges.168 As a result, Mrs. Bullard had violated a Minnesota
statute which said that “proof of an unwarranted denial of or
159. Paterno v. Paterno, 603 A.2d 137, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(court maintained jurisdiction over all equitable remedies and powers of relief
available to the court, but the defendant could also be found liable in criminal
court).
160. Clark v. Bullard, 396 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Clark, 396 N.W.2d at 43.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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interference with duly established visitation may constitute
contempt of court and may be sufficient cause for reversal of
custody.”169 Consequently, the court awarded Mr. Clark custody.170 The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the modification of custody based on the findings that the trial court had
not abused its discretion by transferring custody to Mr. Clark.171
While there have been cases where custody has been transferred due to the frustration of visitation, this is not the most
common remedy for a number of reasons.172 Some courts do not
elect to award custody to someone as a punishment to the custodial parent because the noncustodial parent is not necessarily
a better caretaker of the child.173 Consequently, it will not always be in the best interests of the child to switch custody in
order to punish the custodial parent from evading the visitation
order.174 Nevertheless, it is well within the court’s power to
169. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 45.
172. Laloggia-Vonhegel v. Vonhegel, 732 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999). This case is a good example of a court deciding against a change
of custody merely based on a parent’s interference with visitation. In this
case, the mother moved to from Florida to New York without providing notice
to her ex-husband, and the trial court wanted to sanction her by making a
temporary change of physical custody. Id. The decision, however, was reversed because the appellate court did not believe a change of custody to be
the appropriate sanction. Id. The court found that:
[T]he general purpose of a civil contempt order is to obtain compliance with the trial court’s initial order. The sanction of changing custody does not coerce compliance; rather, it may, in the absence of a
finding that such a change is in the best interest of the children, penalize the children for the parent’s contumacious conduct. In comparison, an award of make-up or additional visitation may serve both
to redress the wrong to the parent and to effectuate compliance with
the court’s authority.
Id. As a result, the court reversed the change of custody because there was
“insufficient evidence to ground a finding that it would be in the children’s
best interest to be placed in Mr. Von Hegel’s custody, even temporarily.” Id.
173. Id. (“The custodial parent’s relocating the children to another state is
insufficient by itself to warrant a change in custody.”). In reversing the
change of custody, the court demonstrated that there is an “extraordinary
burden of proving a substantial and material change of circumstances such
that it would be detrimental to the children to remain in the custody of [the
custodial parent.]” Id.
174. In J.B. v. A.B., the court held that “the award of custody ‘should not be
an exercise in punishment of an offending spouse. In punishing the offending
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award temporary legal and physical custody to the noncustodial
parent when there are repeated violations of visitation orders.175
Due to the potential pitfalls related to ordering a change in
custody, courts are more inclined to hold parents in civil contempt for violating custody decrees in order to coerce them into
complying with visitation rights.176 In fact, parents can be held
in civil or criminal contempt and sentenced to jail time even
when they attempt to comply with the court order and do not
intentionally disregard a court order.177 Furthermore, one does

spouse one may also punish the innocent child, and our law will not tolerate
that result.’” J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 256 (W. Va. 1978) (citations omitted). For a case in which a trial court’s modification of a change in custody is
reversed, see Arnold v. Gouvitsa, 735 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In
this case, the appeals court voided a trial court’s order to change custody
based on a mother’s refusal to abide by its prior orders. Id. at 463. The decision, however, was voided in this case because of a jurisdictional matter. Id.
at 463–64. Under the UCCJA, the court found that the trial court erred by
making a custody determination under the guise of a contempt proceeding.
Id. at 463. Since the custodial parent was not given notice regarding a custody proceeding, the court found that notice was defective, and the case was
reversed. Id.
175. See Shonkwiler v. Kriska, 780 So. 2d 703, 704 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000). In
this case, the father was granted temporary custody because the mother had
deliberately moved twenty times in a four-year period in order to deny him
visitation rights. Id. at 704. In addition, the mother had left the state with
the children for a full year. Id. Consequently, the court found that it would
be in the child’s best interests to temporarily switch custody over to the father. Id. In addition, the mother was sentenced to 30 days in prison. Id. at
705.
176. See generally Ex Parte: Rebecca Ann Hudson, 429 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1983) (affirming contempt order for indefinite period of time).
177. See Kurincic v. Kurincic, No. 76505, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3957, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2000) for an example of a parent being held in civil
contempt. See also Whitman v. Whitman, 2000 Ohio 1935, 1935 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000) for a case of criminal contempt. It is not easy to draw a line between civil contempt and criminal contempt, but the test for determining
whether to impose a sentence of civil or criminal contempt was established in
United States v. Shillitani. US v. Shillitani, 384 U.S. 364, 364 (1966). The
test that the Whitman court used asks the appellate court to discern what the
trial court primarily sought to accomplish by imposing sentence.
While both types of contempt contain an element of punishment,
courts distinguish criminal and civil contempt not on the basis of
punishment, but rather, by character and purpose of the punishment.…The purpose of a civil contempt citation is to coerce, whereas
the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish.
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not even have to prevent visitation to be held in contempt; instead, it is enough to engage in behavior that undermines or
alienates a child’s relationship with his or her noncustodial
parent.178 In these instances, punishment is considered proper
and justified because one cannot use the defense to a charge of
civil contempt that one unintentionally disregarded the court
order.179 Generally, when one is placed in civil contempt, it is
within the parent’s power to get freed from jail by purging his
or her contempt by complying with the order.
Judges are not limited to the remedy of incarceration, but,
rather, are authorized to provide other remedial relief such as
fines in order to coerce the plaintiff’s compliance with the visitation schedule.180 In Olexovitch v. Carralero, for example, when
the court found that a mother had been alienating her child
from her father, the court ordered her to take the child to therapy sessions in order to heal the relationship that she had attempted to wound.181
V. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RIGHTS
OF ACCESS
A. Thomson v. Thomson
While the Convention does not authorize a return remedy for
parents with rights of access, it still leaves it up to the courts to
decide whether a person had rights of access or rights of custody. In Thomson v. Thomson, both parents were seeking custody of their seven month old child in Scotland.182 The Scottish
Id. (citations omitted). In general, domestic relations cases are more likely to
impose civil contempt than criminal contempt. A.G. v. R.M.D. 19896 Mo. App.
LEXIS 4630, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1986).
178. See Olexovitch v. Carralero, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 580 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2001).
179. See Pugh v. Pugh, 472 N.E.2d 1089 (Ohio. 1984). “[N]o inquiry into
intent to disobey is required to determine whether a civil contempt has been
committed.” A.G. v. R.M.D, 1986 Mo. App. LEXIS, at *8–9. Since intent is
irrelevant, good faith is also not considered a valid defense to civil contempt.
Id. at *9. Instead, one just has to knowingly violate a court mandate. Id. at
*10. However, judges may take intent into consideration when they are creating a punishment for civil contempt. Id.
180. Olexovitch, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 580.
181. Id.
182. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589 (Can.).
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Court granted interim custody to the child’s mother and interim
access to the father.183 Additionally, the court ordered that the
184
child remain in Scotland pending a final order. Nevertheless,
Mrs. Thomson took the child to Canada and eventually decided
to stay in violation of the court order.185 If the Canadian court
followed Croll’s rationale that the father only had rights of access, it would have had to refuse jurisdiction to order a return
remedy. However, the court in Thomson did not refuse jurisdiction.186 Instead, the court found that “while the Convention does
not provide specifically for remedial flexibility, a court must be
assumed to have sufficient control over its process to take the
necessary action to meet the purpose and spirit of the Convention.”187 The court found that ordering the return of the child
188
would meet the purpose and the spirit of the Convention.
B. David v. Zamira
In 1991, a New York family court had to decide whether to re189
turn two children to Canada. The facts in this case were similar to Croll in that the mother had custody of their son, and the
father was granted regular visitation according to their separation agreement.190 At some point after Zamira gave birth to
their second child, David applied for an order to prevent Zamira
from removing the children from Ontario and from getting
passports for them.191 The Supreme Court of Ontario granted
the request.192 Nevertheless, Zamira left Ontario and David
filed an application pursuant to the Hague Convention.193 The
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589 (Can.).
189. David v. Zamira, 151 Misc. 2d 630. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
190. Id. at 632.
191. Id. While Zamira had been granted custody of the older child when the
couple separated, she was never granted custody of the younger child because
she was born after the separation agreement. Id. Therefore, while one could
argue that Zamira was only violating David’s rights of access with regard to
their older son, there is no question that she was violating his rights of custody with regard to their younger daughter. Id. at 635.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General forwarded the application to the U.S. Department of State, and the Department of
State communicated with the New York State Clearinghouse
for Missing and Exploited Children.194 Eventually, the children
were located in Brooklyn, New York.195
When David located the children in New York, he returned to
the Supreme Court of Canada and was granted temporary custody of both children.196 One month later, the Supreme Court of
Ontario made a finding that Zamira had wrongfully and improperly removed the children from Ontario.197 The following
month, the Supreme Court of Ontario issued a similar order
stating that Zamira was withholding her children from David
even though he was entitled to custody and access.198 Then,
David filed a motion for enforcement of the Supreme Court of
Ontario’s order.199
In David v. Zamira, as in Croll, there was a ne exeat clause as
a result of the separation agreement.200 This case differs from
Croll in that it is governed by Canadian law, which ordinarily
presumes that both parents are equally entitled to custody of a
child.201 While David had given up his right with regard to his
194. Id.
195. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 635.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 632–33.
198. Id. at 633.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 634. The New York Supreme Court took judicial
notice of the fact that in Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act, which provides
that “father and mother of a child are equally entitled to the custody of the
child.” Id. It is worth noting that Ontario’s recognition that parents are
equally entitled to custody of the child is not universally revered. For example, the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) submitted a
brief to the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access in March of
1998. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, CUSTODY AND
ACCESS: AN NAWL BRIEF TO THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON CHILD
CUSTODY AND ACCESS (1998), available at http://www.harbour.sfu.ca/freda/
reports/custody.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). NAWL is a “national, nonprofit, feminist organization active in legal research, law reform, and public
education.” Id. As part of its brief, NAWL believed there was a “growing and
disturbing trend by Canadian courts to eliminate the distinction between sole
custody with access and joint custody, by giving access parents almost the
same rights as custodial parents.” Id. NAWL also lists a great number of
assumptions that it believes are inaccurate. Id. For example, NAWL believes
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son in the separation agreement, which was executed prior to
the birth of his daughter, David was still entitled to equal custody of his daughter.202 Additionally, according to the separation agreement, Zamira was not permitted to leave Toronto,
much less Canada.203
However, in contrast to Croll, the court was willing to ensure
that the Canadian ruling would be allowed to take effect.204 In
fact, the court disregarded the access rights versus custody
rights debate by finding that Zamira’s “contemptuous conduct,
and the subsequent orders of the Supreme Court of Ontario
which give temporary custody of both children to the petitioner”
made her argument lose its merit.205 Therefore, unlike in Croll,
the court found that there was a wrongful removal within the
meaning of the Hague Convention.206 Since the court also did
not find any of the exceptions to the Hague Convention to be
applicable, they ordered the return of the children.207
Croll and David, may seem inconsistent. However, there is
no question that the court in David came to the correct decision,
for it actually did what the Hague Convention should have set
out to accomplish, which is to ensure that the country of habitual residence is able to determine custody disputes, under the
presumption that the habitual residence is best equipped to
handle such cases.208 This case can, however, be reconciled with
Croll because of the differences between Canadian and U.S.
law. Since Ontario presumes that both parents have rights of
custody,209 the court did not find that they had to refuse jurisdicthat maximum contact with both parents is not necessarily in the best interests of all children, frequent access is not necessarily more beneficial, and
proximity is not necessarily an accurate way to predict regular contact. Id.
Additionally, NAWL also “strongly opposes any presumption of joint custody,
in any legislation whether it be federal, provincial or territorial. There is no
evidence to support that a presumption of joint custody is in the best interests
of the child and the needs of the child.” Id.
202. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 634–35.
203. Id. at 635.
204. Id.
205. Id. Once David was granted temporary custody of both children,
Zamira could not longer successfully argue that she was only violating his
rights of access as opposed to rights of custody. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 637.
208. See Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 446–47.
209. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C.12, § 20(1) (1990) (Can.).
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tion even though when interpreting an international treaty,
treaty definitions should take precedence over State law.210 Instead, the court found a wrongful removal and ordered that the
child be returned under the terms of the Convention.211
Since there is no such presumption in Hong Kong, however,
the Croll court could not proceed once it determined that Mr.
Croll did not have rights of custody.212 However, even if Hong
Kong did have such a presumption, it is the requested State’s
decision whether there are rights of access or rights of custody.213 Therefore, due to some courts’ aversion and inability to
interpret foreign law, results in similar cases can be quite different. These two separate outcomes in factually similar situations point out that the Convention fails to precisely define the
scope of protected rights. In David, the court was forced to interpret Canadian law in order to determine whether the parent
had and was exercising rights of custody.214 Similarly, in Croll,
the court had to interpret Hong Kong law to determine whether
the parent had and was exercising rights of custody.215
The problem is that the Hague Convention was not designed
for courts to interpret the family law of foreign countries; this
procedure is fraught with problems and is bound to lead to misinterpretation and inconsistent adjudications.216 Instead, the
210. In other words, since the court found that David had rights of custody,
they avoided the Convention’s definition of rights of access.
211. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 637.
212. Croll, 229 F.3d at 143–44.
213. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 452 (“As for knowing when joint custody
exists, that is a question which must be decided in each particular case, and in
light of the law of the child’s habitual residence.”).
214. David, 151 Misc. 2d at 634.
215. Croll, F.3d at 135.
216. This difficulty is clearly evidenced in Friedrich v. Friedrich. Friedrich
v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996) where an American servicewoman was living abroad with her husband and child. Following an argument, Mrs. Friedrich brought the child to the United States, and Mr. Friedrich filed a petition under the Hague Convention. Id. In the first case, the
petition was denied, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
because the trial court had failed to determine whether Mr. Friedrich had
rights of custody under German law. Id. On remand, the district court found
that there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Friedrich had rights of
custody because under German law, both parents retain rights of custody
unless the court issued a decree limiting the rights of one of the parents. Id.
The court refused to decide whether Mr. Friedrich had actually exercised
those custody rights because it felt that foreign courts should refrain from
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Hague Convention should simply ensure that the custody determinations in a child’s habitual residence are respected, for
there is a strong presumption that the courts in the child’s habitual residence are in the best position to protect the best interests of child.217 Since there is no reason that a court in a
child’s habitual residence is any less capable of protecting a
child’s best interests in cases where a parent has rights of access, there is no reason that these court determinations should
not be upheld and reinforced. The best way to ensure that
these decisions are respected is by issuing a return remedy,
which should be extended to situations in which a parent’s
rights of access have been unilaterally violated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction has not settled with any certainty how States
218
should handle cases where rights of access are violated.
While the Croll court tried to interpret the Convention as literally as possible, the court in Thomson made a decision based on
what it thought were the interests of justice as well as the purpose and spirit of the Convention. Therefore, while Croll followed what it was mandated to do by the Convention, the result
of that act is questionable because the solution did not reflect
the purpose and spirit of the Convention. As a result, it is necessary for an amendment to the Hague Convention to harmonize the purpose and spirit of the Convention with the interests
of justice. To do so, the Hague Convention should authorize a
return remedy for parents with rights of access. Such an
amendment would not only benefit the left-behind parent with
rights of access, but would also benefit the international community because it would ensure that the custody determinamaking policy decisions, but, rather, allow the home state to determine the
merits of the custody dispute. Id. at 1065.
217. Pérez-Vera, supra note 31, at 434–35. As Pérez-Vera noted:
[S]ignatory States [must] be convinced that they belong, despite their
differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them –
those of the child’s habitual residence – are in principle best placed to
decide upon the questions of custody and access.
Id.
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tions of the habitual residence would be enforced. Most importantly, however, it would benefit the child, because there is no
reason to believe that the harmful effects of separation from a
parent are lessened based on whether the child’s parent had
custody or merely rights of access. In addition, the return remedy will ensure that the laws of the home state are respected
and enforced, another important goal of the Convention. As a
result of this change, even more abductions would be prevented,
for there would be even less incentive to forum shop. Further,
justice will be served because the best interests of the child will
be given paramount importance. While the majority opinion
claimed that the Convention would be unworkable if a ne exeat
clause were to lead to a mandatory return,219 this is simply evidence of the Convention’s failure to take into consideration the
likely harmful effect such a disruption will have on a child’s life.
Daniel M. Fraidstern∗

219. Croll, 229 F.3d at 143. See Weiner, supra note 34, at n.125. Here,
Weiner argues that the court’s reasoning for claiming that the Convention
would become unworkable if it required return of a parent who left the country in violation of a ne exeat clause was problematic (“The court’s reasoning
was tautological. Only by defining the issue at hand as ‘rights of access’ could
it reach this result.”).
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